Fiscal behavior according to the slippery slope framework in samples from Argentina and Spain
Tanos Robein, Lucas
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Typical mechanisms to reduce tax evasion are often based on rational models. Empirical evidence against these models led to the development of an integrative conceptual framework: Slippery Slope Framework (SSF). SSF postulates that tax compliance depends on trust in authorities and perceived power. In this context, we conducted two experiments. In both studies we used a 2 (trust: high vs low) x 2 (power: high vs low) between-subjects design. In the first experiment we tested the effect of experimental manipulation on tax behavior on students from different socio-economic contexts (Argentina and Spain), without observing statistically significant effects. In the second one, we conducted a replication by Kogler et al. (2013) with students from Argentina, measuring the intention to pay taxes. The results provided evidence in favor of SSF. We discuss the results of each study and we emphasize the importance of carrying out experiments with tax behavior as a dependent variable and of testing SSF hypotheses in different contexts.
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